We present empirical evidence indicating the existence of a description/experience gap for decisions under uncertainty. The nature of the gap is different than the one arising in the case of risk but both phenomena depend essentially on the use of limited sampling in experience. While subjects are ambiguity averse in description they are robustly ambiguity seeking in experience. A probabilistic explanation of this effect is provided as well as conjectures about the possibility of studying the effect with descriptive theories like Cumulative Prospect Theory.
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Horacio Arlo-Costa
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Varun Dutt
Department of Engineering and Public Policy
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Carnegie Mellon University
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Cleotilde Gonzalez
Social and Decision Sciences
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Jeffrey Helzner
Department of Philosophy
Columbia University
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| Horacio Arlo-Costa | hcosta@andrew.cmu.edu | |
| Varun Dutt | vdutt@andrew.cmu.edu | |
| Cleotilde Gonzalez | coty@cmu.edu | |
| Jeffrey Helzner | jh2239@columbia.edu |
Send any remarks to isipta11@uibk.ac.at.